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Fordham: The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Proposal

THE WEST VIRGINIA MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
PROPOSAL
JEFF

B.

FORDHAM

In the Autumn of 1936 the voters of West Virginia will be
faced with the question, shall the "Municipal Home Rule Amendment" to the Constitution be adopted? The Act initiating the
proposed amendment was adopted in March, 1935.' Previous efforts to secure passage of such an act had failed. 2 The amendment,
upon adoption would constitute section 39 (a) of Article VI of
the organic law. Section 39, it may be recalled, forbids special
legislation as to eighteen specified subjects, including the incorporation of municipalities with population of less than 2,000 or the
amending of their charters. The proposed new section, which follows, would render this restriction applicable to all municipalities:
"No local or special law shall hereafter be passed incorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending their charters.
The legislature shall provide by general laws for the incorporation and government of cities, towns and villages and shall
classify such municipal corporations, upon the basis of population, into not less than two nor more than five classes.' Such
general laws shall restrict the powers of such cities, towns and
villages to borrow money and contract debts, and shall limit
the rate of taxes for municipal purposes, in accordance with
section one, article ten of the constitution of the state of West
Virginia.4 Under such general laws, the electors of each
municipal corporation, wherein the population exceeds two
thousand,' shall have power and authority to frame, adopt
and amend the charter of such corporation, or to amend an
existing charter thereof, and through its legally constituted
authority, may pass all laws and ordinances relating to its
municipal affairs: Provided, That any such charter or amendment thereto, and any such law or ordinance so adopted, shall
be invalid and void if inconsistent or in conflict with this constitution or the general laws of the state then in effect, or
thereafter, from time to time enacted."
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
Absent on leave, 1935-36.
1 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 22.
2 The writer does not now have access to the records but he has personal
knowledge of the introduction in the legislature at the last two regular sessions of at least one bill to initiate a municipal home rule amendment to the
Constitution and one to effect home rule simply by act of the legislature.
The former was lost in the rush at the end of the 1933 session.
3 The Committee proposal required from ' 'three"
to live classes.
4 So much of this sentence as follows the last comma is new. The reforence, of course, is to the Levy Limitation Amendment.
: The Committee proposal fixed 5,000 as the minimum population figure.
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The model used by the draftsmen was the proposal contained
in the report of Governor Conley's Constitutional Committee submitted on December 1, 1930. This was, in turn, modeled on two
sections of the Michigan Constitution." The three changes which
appear in the new draft will be considered later. In 1932 the
writer published in this Quarterly an analysis of the Committee
proposal considered in the light of West Virginia's situation.7
While there has been no radical change in his views on the subject, he is emboldened to take up the issue again, now that the
matter is to be put to the voters. It is of the greatest importance
that in some manner critical interest in the proposal be stimulated.
The discussion that follows is addressed to the lawyers of
West Virginia. It is manifest that the complex legal aspects of the
proposed amendment will not be understood by the voters as a
whole. That circumstance imposes the peculiar responsibility upon the Bar of the state to give the measure careful study and then
to inform the electorate of its merits as a legal instrument. More
than that, members of the Bar would be in a position to give intelligent guidance as to the merits of the substance of municipal
home rule, once they had given it adequate study.
In the case of the Levy Limitation Amendment, adopted in
1932, we lawyers were sorely delinquent in failing to reveal the
flaws in the Amendment in advance. The state awoke after the
election on the brink of serious impairment of governmental services, which was entirely needless and inexcusable., The proposal
should have been more thoroughly worked out in the first instance,
but, in any event, the Bar of the state should have laid bare its
defects before it reached the polls. It behooves us, then, to take
a look at the municipal home rule proposal while there is yet time.
The prime concern of the amendment is the abolition of special
chartering. The merit of that reform is so plain to most people
who are familiar with the career of special chartering in West
Virginia that one is likely to be predisposed in favor of a proposal
which would put an end to the practice.9 Moreover, the casual
reaction one has to the suggestion that municipalities be given
art. 8, §§ 20, 21.
7Fordham, The West Virginia Municipal Home Bule Proposal (1932)
6 MICH. CONST.

38
W. VA. L. Q. 235, 329.
s The background of the amendment, its slipshod character and the painful process of trying to give it rational and workable application are all
described by Sly and Shipman in Public Affairs Bull. No. 8, Tax Limitation
in West Virginia (Bureau for Government Research, West Virginia University,
1934).
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"Home Rule" is likely to be favorable due, it may be, to the attractive catch-phrase quality of the expression. It is associated
with our traditional attachment to local self government. These
very circumstances render it the more important that the matter be
scrutinized with honest skepticism.
It may be a circumstance of some interest that when the writer
first approached the subject in the fall of 1931 he entertained the
notion that Municipal Home Rule would be a good thing for West
Virginia. A study of the proposal of the Constitutional Committee
upon the actual West Virginia background unseated that belief and
impelled the conviction that the proposal itself was not satisfactory
in any event.
1.
The phrase "municipal home rule" does not have any fixed
content. At best, one cannot even approach preciseness of meaning except with reference to the law of a particular state. About
the only element that may claim universality is the power of the
local electorate, through representatives, to draft, adopt and amend
the municipal charter. Even this authority may be little more
than a shadow if the grant does not come directly from the constitution but is the fruit of so-called legislative home rule, under
which it is left to the legislature to extend charter-making powers
to cities. As a matter of description it is true that in most of the
eighteen'0 home rule states the municipalities affected are given
either complete or extensive law-making power with respect to
matters loosely classed under the head of municipal affairs, municipal concerns, local affairs or some similar generality. But too
often a confusing want of correlation between the charter-making
power and the substance of municipal autonomy is present in the
constitutional grant.
What may be termed strictly constitutional home rule makes
an allocation of powers as between the legislature and home rule
cities which is binding upon both. On the other hand the constitution may require or authorize the legislature to delegate legislative powers to home rle cities. Thus the legislature may be
left with just as free a hand as ever it had in determining the
9 The subject was considered at length in op. cit. supra n. 7, at 238 et acq.
10 The seventeen home rule states as of April 1932, are listed ibid., at 236,
237. The only recent convert is Utah, which adopted a constitutional amendment in November 1932, providing for the state's own brand of legislative
home rule. UTAH CoNsT. art. 11, § 5.
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measure of legislative power it would confer upon municipal governing bodies.
The constitution may or may not provide the machinery for
exercising charter-maling powers. It may be entirely general as
to the domain of municipal authority or it may proceed to specify
certain matters of municipal competence. Nowhere have home
rule draftsmen had the hardihood to attempt complete specification in the organic law of the matters covered by such an expression as "municipal affairs". On the other hand, there are
several examples of explicit statement of municipal powers with
respect to subjects so affected with both general and local interests,
that as applied to them the distinction between local and general
concerns may be meaningless."
The municipal home rule movement has not been so much a
campaign for municipal autonomy as a protest against the evils
of legislative abuse with respect to particular cities. Home rule
has been sought more as a remedy for an existing ill than as an
expression of a philosophy of government inspired by faith in the
virtues of local autonomy.' 2 It is most significant that the practical objectives of the movement have been largely associated with
freeing large cities from the dominance of legislatures controlled
by, often hostile, representatives from the less populous and
wealthy communities of the state.13 Metropolitan districts, moreover, are confronted with regional problems, which may demand
governmental machinery and authority peculiarly adapted to their
situations.
While home rule does not stop with placing a ban upon leg11 California and Colorado have adopted the practice, as it were, of so
amending the home rule provisions of their constitutions after unpopular decisions of the courts relating to the content of the general grant as to spell
out the matter with respect to the subjects in question. The California provisions have been amended no less than six times. See CALi.. CONST. art. 11,
§§ 6, 8 and 11; COLO. CoNsT. art. 20. The original Michigan and Ohio provisions contained some specification. MIcH. CONST. art. 8, § 22 et seq.; Onlo
i
CONsT. art. 18.
The difficulty of applying the artificial distinction between general and local
concerns imposes an almost impossible duty upon the courts. Two recent
cases in which the courts were badly divided illustrate the fact. City and
County of Denver v. Henry, 38 P. (2d) 895 (Colo. 1934) (traffic control);
City of Ardmore v. Excise Board of Carter County, 8 P. (2d) 2 (Okla. 1932)
(fiscal control - appropriation for airport lease).
12 See MCGoLDRIcK,

THE LAw AND PRACTICE OF' MUNICIPAL HOiE RULE,

1916-1930 (1933) 302.
12 Thus, New York, Chicago and Milwaukee have been focal points in the
home rule movements in their respective states.

ful.

Chicago has been unsuccess-

In Maryland home rule is granted to Baltimore alone, the state's one

great city. MD. CONST. art.

11A.
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islative exploitation and tinkering with urban organization and
interests it has not been thought out on the positive side. It takes
small account of contemporary developments in public administration. The sum total of our governmental experience does not
enable us inductively to formulate a sound, realistic principle of
apportionment of governmental powers between such units as the
state and its muncipalities. Something consistent with the immediate picture might be roughly approximated, but, like a law book,
it would be out of date almost from the moment it was produced.
Federal-state relations are a matter beyond the scope of this
paper but is is not amiss to point out that any fixed geographical
apportionment of the powers of government is bound to be permeated with artificiality. Thus it is that the constitutional distinetion between interstate and intrastate commerce survives today without a counterpart in the economic picture. 14 It is simply
to be expected that the necessity of getting things done and done
effectively will find a way when artificial legal barriers stand in
the path. The irrepressible growth of so-called federal grantsin-aid to the state is no mere anomaly. It has been found to be
a way to expand and improve public services in fields that are
wont to be described as state matters. To attack the development
as an invasion of state's rights is to miss the whole point. There
will always be ample room for local or state responsibility in public administration without insisting that a line on a map shall
determine the basis upon which we commit ourselves unalterably
to conduct our public affairs. Municipal home rule ignores what
I make bold to call the fact that effective public administration
demands the adaptation of structure and authority to function and
not the converse. Home rule, moreover, passes over the general
interest in the maintenance of minimum standards of public service in all communities. It is as much a sense of self-interest as
altruism that has brought us past the day when we will say of
backward communities that we are not our brother's keeper.
2.
In pursuing the consideration of home rule as a potentiality
in West Virginia the material will be divided into the following
heads: the process of developing a home rule proposal, the demand
14 This is not to say that the courts ought to ignore the constitutional distinction, althought ony state conception of it is not justifiable and even less
desirable.
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for the reform, the need for home rule, the substantive objections to
the change and the adequacy of the proposal as drawn.
In the study of the subject, the results of which previously
appeared in this Quarterly, the material was penetrated, it is believed, to a point justifying the expression of at least tentative
views upon the merits. The subsequent career of public affairs
in the state has not made the case for home rule any stronger.
Nevertheless, the writer's present cause for concern is not so much
the belief that the adoption of municipal home rule would be a
mistake as the obviously blundering and superficial course which
the process of amending the constitution is taking. It did not begin with a factual and legal study of existing municipal government in the state. The legislature assumed no responsibility on
that score, neither were the inter-relationships of municipal and
state administration re-examined, nor was the experience of the
home rule states thoroughly canvassed. The decisions of the courts
of other states on home rule questions are particularly significant
to the draftsmen because they objectify flaws and twilight-zone
difficulties which he can cope with deliberately.
At the very minimum the amendment and the enabling act
should have been worked out together. The state's recent experience with the Levy Limitation Amendment should serve as a
vivid object lesson as to the evils of putting the matter up to the
people and leaving it to a subsequent legislature to try to anchor
the amendment to the realities of our governmental structure and
administration. It is a simple matter of applying the old adage,
"look before you leap." Drafting enabling legislation in advance
would be a great aid in exploring the implications of the subject.
It is about the closest thing we have to a laboratory in which to
put the abstruse generalities of the proposal to the concrete test.
It is an especially valuable adjunct to good drafting because it
reveals such defects as gaps, conflicts and ambiguities.
It is only fair to say that the Constitutional Committee whose
proposal is largely followed in the present measure undoubtedly
gave the subject serious study. But the members of that group
had the entire constitution to consider. Manifestly they could not
conduct a complete investigation of every subject considered. The
writer ventures to suggest, moreover, that they were less advocates
of home rule than opponents of special chartering. Their work
did not relieve the legislature of the responsibility of approaching
the subject from the ground up.
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With the possible exception of the capital city, Charleston,"3
the demand for home rule has not been grounded upon legislative
abuse, but is an indictment of the special charter system. So far
as the writer is aware instances of failure to obtain adequate grants
of power for municipal needs have been rare. It is true that in
some communities in the state there is a definite sentiment for home
rule, the strength of which I have no desire to discount. But,
if it be true that this feeling is less a matter of espousing home rule
than of waging war on special chartering the real objective could
be obtained more simply. It is high time West Virginia was discarding the special charter system but it is plainly not desirable
to proceed beyond satisfactory measures to that end without
weighing what we are about in terms of different objectives.
3.
The proposed amendment requires whatever measure of home
rule municipalities of over 2,000 inhabitants are to receive to be
handed on to them through "general laws" by the legislature. It
is not likely that this mandate would be disobeyed because the
abolition of special chartering removes the temptation to legislative truancy. It may be, however, that some West Virginians
will find the amendment to conceal what will be for them,"" a joker.
The proviso which follows the language of the amendment relative
to home rule powers would render invalid any home rule charter
provision or legislative act which was "inconsistent or in conflict
with ....
the general laws of the state." Now, "general laws"
may connote either the form and operative effect of statutes, the
nature of the subject matter to which they relate, or both. It is
plain that the use of the expression in that part of the amendment
which precedes the proviso employs the first connotation since it
appears in contradiction to "local or special law." The subject
matter of these "general laws", the incorporation and government
of municipalities, combines elements of both local and general
interest. In short, the legislature could confine home rule powers
as narrowly as it pleased so long as it did so by statutes of general
15 The very fact that Charleston is the capital city has made its charter an
attractive item for legislative tinkering. Ripper legislation relating to the
City of Williamson was attacked without success in Booten v. Pinson, 77 W.
Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985 (1915).
is It seems hardly unfair to say that the voters are not to be expected to
dig out for themselves the legal implications of the proposal. More than that,
few of those with the requisite specialized knowledge are likely to do so in
fact.
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operation - by the home rule enabling act itself if no other.
Whether the state Supreme Court of Appeals would apply the rule
that the judicial interpretation of so much of the Michigan constitution as was borrowed by the amendment would be adopted, in
effect, along with the amendment itself in West Virginia remains
to be seen,17 but it is worth observing that the Iichigan cases support the present interpretation of "general laws". 1
Does West Virginia need legislative home rule? The whole
matter turns upon whether the cities of the state require chartermaking powers to assure themselves adequate governmental machinery and authority. Now, a set of reasonably comprehensive
general laws on the subject might be expected to suffice for any
municipality not confronted with peculiar regional or metropolitan
problems. Wheeling is the only community which may even be
nominated for the exceptional class. The heart of legislative home
rule would be the enabling act. Conceivably it might be so specific as to both the form and powers of municipal government that
it would leave the municipal charter-making province a mere shell.
Were the legislature to go to the other extreme by adopting the
general language of the amendment the cities would have, at legislative sufferance, maximum competence within the constitution to
supply possible gaps in structure and authority but such enabling
legislation would introduce one of the worst feature of constitutional home rule. It would pass on to the courts substantially the
whole responsibility for marking out the content of home rule
powers because the amendment does not purport to delimit the
charter-making authority further than to require that the product consist with general laws and the only additional specification
as to municipal legislative powers is to confine them to the unsurveyable realm of "municipal affairs." A middle course, expressed
in an enabling act which detailed as far as practicable the legislative notion of the content of "municipal affairs", but which left
large leeway for local determination of matters of structure, would
probably be the best alternative.
This preferred type of enabling act is least objectionable but
that does not help to establish an affirmative need for legislative
17 While the rule is more commonly applied in statutory construction it is
applicable to the copying of a constitutional provision of another state.

See

2 Llwis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1904)

§

404,

citing cases. It is open to doubt that the Supreme Court of Appeals would,
in the present instance, consider the Michigan cases authoritative since several changes in verbiage have been made.
is They are collected in McGo LnicK, op. cit. supra n. 12, at 191, 192.
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home rule. It would allow greater latitude and, in fact., room for
experimentation, as to the structure of municipal government but
there is little, if anything, to show that this circumstance has been
a stimulus to creative action in states already on the home rule
roster. A system of general laws outlining all the common forms
of municipal government and giving municipalities their choice by
local option, that is, the so-called optional charter system, would
meet existing structural requirements.'
True enough, that system means standardization but it remains to be shown that it
would smother whatever local, creative impulse there may be.
Structural developments could find expression by changes in the
general statute.
It has been urged in behalf of home rule generally that it
operates to stimulate interest in public administration.
If it
really quickened the sense of civic responsibility of the voters that
would be a brilliant star in its crown. Doubtless, citizens who
actually participate in drafting charters would be so affected, and
that is something, but it is a bit too much to expect home rule to
arouse, on a sustained level, a zeal for good government in a publie which to date has, with a few notable exceptions, displayed
such spirit only once or twice in a generation.
4.
If there be no positive need for legislative home rule in West
Virginia, what, if any, are the objections to it?
Some of the
counts against constitutional home rule lie here also, but with less
gravity. In the first place, anything which would tend to revive
the unfortunate sectionalism of West Virginia's past would be a
blow to the state.
A liberal grant of home rule powers by the
legislature might well be expected to accentuate localism. That is
not the path of progress. Independence of spirit is admirable;
local self-sufficiency, on the other hand, is laden with the seed
of stultification. The observation thins out as applied to the larger
cities and might be substantially disposed of by limiting home rule
to a few large centers.
To repose charter-making powers in local hands in communities large and small is to establish a breeding ground for legal complications and litigation. The courts might develop a definite
pattern of interpretation of a statute which set up an optional
19 Examples of this type of system are to be found in Iowa and Kentucky.
IowA CODE (1931) cc. 326-329; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) cc. 116, 118.
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charter system but they would be faced with a great diversity of
charter materials under a home rule regime,20 where problems of
interpretation might often be well-nigh hopeless. True, uniformity of interpretation is not an ultimate but we have told only a
part of the tale. It goes without saying that our small communities have their able people but it takes more than that to produce
a good municipal charter. It is too much to hope that the requisite understanding of municipal government and public administration and grasp of drafting technique exists in such municipalities. Poor drafting may be the assassin of substance. The fact
that there has not been a conspicuously large amount of litigation
involving locally drafted special charters is not very comforting.
Potentially, trouble is there although the inertia of the public
may let almost anything get by. Home rule charters, moreover,
could not be expected to facilitate administration in the growing
list of services demanding state and local co-operation.
5.
One who is persuaded that municipal home rule would not be
good for West Virginia can stand by in Hyperborean aloofness and
scrutinize the immediate proposal as searchingly as he likes without feeling any responsibility for so-called constructive criticism.
Skeptical analysis is entirely appropriate here, however, because
the proposed amendment will go to the voters in its present form,
barring a special session of the legislature the call for which covered the matter of repealing the initiatory act. If it is not so
drawn as to give effective constitutional expression to its purpose
it should not be adopted.
As an ultimate matter the desirability of legislative home rule
is left to the decision of the voters. Unfortunately, most of them
will not vote upon the specific proposal. Instead, each will, at
best, vote upon the question, "shall West Virginia adopt municipal home rule as I conceive it ?" This makes it the more important that the projected amendment be in finished shape, a welldesigned legal tool, before it reaches the polls.
The amendment begins auspiciously with an explicit ban upon
special chartering. It could have stopped right there and left no
serious gap since the legislature would not require express author20 The argument that few of the smaller municipalities would avail themselves of home rule powers is not compelling, even if true. At best it means
that the evil would be quantitatively less and it is not to be overlooked that
the potentiality of its expansion would always be present.
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ity to enact general laws dealing"with the incorporation of municipalities. It could even classify them for the purpose.21 There is
no objection, however, to including a mandate requiring general
laws on the subject. While the prohibition upon local or special
laws relates to "incorporating" cities, towns or villages or amending their charters the next sentence commands the enactment of
general laws for the "incorporation and government" of cities,
towns and villages. This creates a minor ambiguity because local
or special laws providing for the "government" of municipalities
is not forbidden. It is fairly safe to assume, however, that local
or special laws concerning the "government" of municipalities
would not have happy careers in the courts because obedience to
the constitutional mandate would produce general laws covering
the subject of municipal government and any inconsistent local or
special act could not be permitted to stand without making the
requirement meaningless. But the use of similar language in describing both the subject matter excluded from the range of local
or special legislation and that required to be dealt with by general
laws is desirable.
The legislature would be under orders, so to speak, to classify
municipal corporations upon the basis of population into from two
to five classes. For what purpose the classification is to be made is
not stated. One might suppose that the purposes are incorporation
and government but the conjunction "and" appears between the
mandate as to incorporation and government and that relating to
classification. So, taken literally, classification is required aimlessly. It would be easy to dispose of this point in a redraft by
specifically relating the second clause of the compound sentence
to the first one.
The limitation upon the number of classes of municipalities
is wholesome but, as drawn, it does not eliminate the possibility
of legislative subterfuge by way of a law general in form but
applicable in fact to a single city. Thus, Huntington might be
placed in a class by itself under a law creating a class of cities of
over seventy-five thousand people. In order to cover the situation
it would be necessary to specify laws which were general in actual
application as well as form, somewhat after the manner of the New
21 The doctrine of complete legislative supremacy over the being and powers
of municipal corporations obtains in. West Virginia. Booten v. Pinson, supra
n. 15. Thus, the legislature could exercise its plenary power to supplant all
special charters with incorporation on a classified basis under general law.
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York and Wisconsin Amendments.22 If experience of other states
is relevant this precaution would not be amiss.2 . The first clause
in the next sentence of the amendment would require the legislature to embody in the same general laws, that provided for the
incorporation and government of municipalities, restrictions on
their "powers to borrow money and contract debts." The language used was copied uncritically from the Michigan Constitution.
It originated, be it observed, in the Michigan Constitution of 1850,
while the home rule provisions of that state were added in 1908
and 1912.24 It so happens that the Constitution of West Virginia
already contains a section which limits municipal indebtedness to
five per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property within
the territory of the corporation.25 This section also requires that
at the time of incurring indebtedness provision be made "for the
collection of a direct annual tax, sufficient to pay, annually, the
interest on such debt, and the principal thereof, within and not
exceeding thirty-four years." 2 6 Judicial reconciliation of the proposal with this section of the constitution is quite possible but that
does not excuse needless ambiguity.
It seems fair to say that
the Michigan Constitution has been followed without awareness
of the existing section on the subject. If this be a mistaken assumption it is none the less important that the ambiguity be dis22 N. Y. CONST. art. 12, § 2 (forbids legislation which shall "be special or
local either in its terms or in its effects") ; Wis. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (home
rule powers are subject "only to this constitution and to such enactments of
the legislature of state-wide concern as shall uniformly affect every city
or every village").
23 The practice was carried so far in Ohio that draftsmen became careless
about maintaining even the semblance of general law. The state supreme
court in 1902 finally put the quietus on this practice by holding that any
legislative classification of municipalities was unconstitutional and thereby
overruling what had been thought to be a well-entrenched line of cases. State
ex rel. Knisely v. Jones, 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N. E. 424 (1902). This so undermined the jungle of charter material on the statute books that it was necessary to call a special session of the legislature to -provide a way to tide the
municipalities over until a new system could be established. See McBAIN,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MuNicP' HOME RULE (1916) 73-74.
24 The requirement was, in 1908, carried over into art. 8, § 20 of the Constitution
of 1908. The home rule grant appears in the following section.
2
WEST VA. CONST. art. 10, § 8.
20 See the recent case, Warden v. City of Grafton, 176 S. B. 706 (W. Va.
1934).
27 The ambiguity was noticed in (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 329, 336. It may
be that the effect of the new provision would be deemed by the courts simply
to require the legislature to regulate within the existing debt limit. The tax
requirement would also survive under this interpretation. The command to
the legislature would be superfluous, however, because that body has already
regulated the subject within the bounds of the present constitutional provisions. W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 13, art. 1.
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pelled by redrafting the proposal. Were it the design of the proposal to supplant the existing debt limit section with a provision
leaving the matter entirely with the legislature there should be
some independent study of the desirability of the change before
undertaking to redraft the proposal.
The proposal of the Constitutional Committee, like the Michigan Constitution, contained a requirement that the set of general
laws contemplated by the amendment "limit the rate of taxes for
municipal purposes." The present legislative proposal adds the
words, "in accordance with section one, article ten of the constitution of the state of West Virginia." 2 The reference is to the
Levy Limitation Amendment. The effect of the revised provision
is to require legislative action pursuant to an existing constitutional provision which is not self-executing. (It would not do that
accurately, however, since the Levy Limitation Amendment classifies property for tax purposes, specifying a different maximum
levy for each class and thus contemplating different rates, while
the home rule proposal refers to the "rate of taxes".) Such a
mandate is superfluous. It would be better to leave the subject untouched.
Under the self-same general laws "the electors of each municipal corporation, wherein the population exceeds two thousand,
shall have power and authority to frame, adopt and amend the
charter of such corporation, or to amend an existing charter thereof, and through its legally constituted authority, may pass all laws
and ordinances relating to its municipal affairs: Provided, That
any such charter or amendment thereto, and any such law or ordinance so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent or in
conflict with this constitution or the general laws of the state then
in effect, or thereafter, from time to time enacted." This language
and the rest of the long, involved sentence of which it is a part
contains the home rule grant. While the quoted words do not directly command enabling legislation the intention to require the
legislature to delegate the charter-making power is clear. The
absence of any attempt to mark out the substantive range of the
power to be delegated, further than to require consistency with
the constitution and general laws of the state, is rendered conspicuous by the subsequent language providing that the legislative body of a home rule municipality "may pass all laws and
28 This reference to the constitution is awkward and wordy.
reference appears in the last sentence of the proposal.
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ordinances relating to its municipal affairs' 1.29 The range of subjects which might be included in a municipal charter might be
quite different from the nebulous realm of "municipal affairs"
but the requirement of consistency with general laws immediately
makes the difference potentially immaterial. It means that the
legislature by enacting laws of general application may confine both
municipal charter-making and legislative powers as narrowly as
it pleases2 0 This is a desirable feature, in net effect, since it would
leave the state with legislative home rule and not imbed the system
deeply in the constitution. But despite the effect of the proviso
requiring consistency with general laws the affirmative grant of
charter-making and law-making powers should be clearly correlated. It is not helpful to make simply what Professor McBain
calls the adjective grant of power to frame a charter, and then
make a separate grant of municipal law-making power in substantive terms without relating the latter to the charter authority."
The charter is the organic law of the municipality and logically,
if we adhere to the n6tion that municipal legislative powers are not
plenary but only such as are delegated by constitution or statute,
law-making powers would flow from it. The sentence which makes
the home rule grant leaves us in perplexing doubt as to whether
the law-making power is conferred upon I the electors or the corporation. (It is clear that it would be exercised directly by the
corporate governing body in either case.) The matter is not unimportant. If the power were given the corporation it would exist apart from the exercise of the charter authority and thus would
not be properly correlated with the power to make a charter. On
the other hand, if the legislative power be deemed to depend upon
the exercise of the charter authority, municipalities which continued
under special charters would be without the law-making power
contemplated in the proposal until they make it available by a charter amendment. Assuredly, these matters could be dealt with more
intelligibly in a redraft of the proposal.
The amendment would confer the charter-making power upon
the "electors" of a municipality. Must they act directly or might
the legislature provide a method of representative action? The
29 This law-making power, it appears, must be rendered available by enabling legislation. Infra p. 48.
3o See above n. 18, supra.

31 Op. ct. supra m.23, at 668-669.
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2
latter view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan.'1
This undoubtedly conformed to the intention of the draftsmen but
it would have cost very few words to have explicitly authorized
representative action.
Only municipalities eligible for home rule, that is, those with
populations exceeding two thousand, would enjoy the grant of lawmaking power. Some difficulty attends the question whether the
availability of the power would have to await the enactment of
enabling legislation. The answer is probably "yes" because the
sentence which grants both the law-making and charter-making
authority begins with the words "Under such general laws",
which doubtless modify all that follows.
Eligibility for home rule was limited by the Constitutional
Committee proposal to municipalities "wherein the population exceeds five thousand."
The present proposal cuts the minimum
population figure to two thousand. This, as a matter of policy,
is a case of going from bad to worse. It simply has not been made
to appear that the smaller municipalities of the state have the
slightest need of charter-making powers or could exercise them
competently, were they granted. If the matter were vital to local
responsibility for good local government the situation would be
different but that is not the case. The heart of local autonomy
is local control of and responsibility for local administration, not
local charter-making. The Constitutional ban upon special chartering is the only substantial limitation in the proposal upon
legislative dominion over municipalities. The measure of home
rule that would be extended to West Virginia municipalities under
it would simply be a new and less objectionable form of special
chartering. But it would still be a system of numerous independent special laws, which would inevitably be freighted with a large
portion of error, ambiguity and conflict. The writer has not had
extensive practical experience with special legislation but if the
measures within the range of that experience have been fairly
representative the quality of that body of our public law, especially in matters of draftsmanship, is distinctly inferior.
The essential kinship of legislative home rule and special
chartering becomes more evident when one examines the perfunctory legislative process in special charter matters. The draftsmanship as well as the impulse for charter changes is almost uni-

32 Attorney General ex rel. Hudson v. Common Council of Detroit, 164 Mich.
369, 129 N. W. 879 (1911). See McBmx, op. cit. supra n. 23, at 613-614.
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versally local. Fre.quently referendum classes are attached as a
means of resting ultimate responsibility upon the municipal electorate. The legislature performs the desultory function of rubberstamping the local measure. From the standpoint of the legislature home rule would end the special charter evil and thus lift a
needless burden but, regarded in the large, much of the substance
of that system would remain to clutter the jurisprudence of the
state.
The amendment would permit home rule cities to amend existing special charters, thus taking up where the legislature is required to leave off in the special chartering process. Whether this
should be permitted is, of course, a matter of policy. It would
not be so objectionable as applied to special charters which are
compact workable instruments.
In addition to the second alternative of starting afresh with
a new home rule charter, might the legislature offer still another
choice in the form of simple incorporation under general law?
The point is very much in doubt. With reference to the Michigan
Constitution Professor MeBain has said that the power is probably denied by implication.3 It is believed that the point is debatable but it is enough to say here that good drafting would have
left no room for serious question. An additional alternative would
increase the diversity of municipal organization and to that extent
would be open to objection. The superiority of the system of simple incorporation under general law seems great enough to overbalance that consequence, however.
Summary
1. The question of policy.
While opinion on the merits will differ widely the view recorded in the foregoing pages is that municipal home rule is not
desirable in West Virginia. A self-executing constitutional grant
of home rule would be seriously objectionable. Legislative home
rule would be less vulnerable and much would depend upon the
nature and quality of enabling legislation, At best, however, it
does not appear that West Virginia needs such a system even were
the objections to local charter-making minimized.
Incorporation under general laws which would set up the
optional charter system would be preferable as a successor to
3

pO.cit. sapra n. 23, at 607.
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special chartering. Limited classification under laws that would
be actually general in application is also desirable.
2. The adequacy of the immediate proposal.
Quite apart from considerations of the substance the present
draft of a constitutional amendment is not acceptable. It is so
unsatisfactory in form and detail that it should be rejected at the
polls. There is no reason why proponents of municipal home rule
in West Virginia should not have the verdict of the electorate upon
the subject once it has been properly developed to that point. It
is too plain for argument, however, that the mafter is not now ripe
for a referendum. The present proposal is the superficial product
of inadequate study. The real question at the election will relate
to the specific proposal and not municipal home rule in vacuo. It
is, then, of the utmost importance that the electorate be not imposed upon.
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